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RELIGION, MARRIAGE, AND PLURALISM
Joel A. Nichols∗
INTRODUCTION
On November 2, 2010, Oklahoma citizens overwhelmingly voted to amend
their state constitution by adopting the “Save Our State Amendment.”1
According to the amendment, it was needed to prevent state courts from
“look[ing] to the legal precepts of other nations or cultures. Specifically, the
courts shall not consider international law or Sharia Law.”2 By implication,
then, the amendment was needed to save Oklahoma from the allegedly
impending threat of imposition of international or Sharia law. Only two days
after seventy percent of the electorate voted in favor of the amendment,
Muneer Awad sued to enjoin it from taking effect. He claimed that the
amendment violates both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. District Court agreed and issued a
preliminary injunction less than four weeks later.3 Notwithstanding, several
other states have moved to ban Sharia law4 and some conservative groups have
sought to make rejection of Sharia law a litmus test for 2012 Republican
presidential candidates.5

∗ Associate Professor, University of St. Thomas School of Law (Minnesota), and Senior Fellow, Emory
University Center for the Study of Law and Religion. B.A., Abilene Christian University (Texas) (1995); J.D.
and M.Div., Emory University (2000). I am grateful to Mitchell Gordon, Colleen Murphy, and participants at a
faculty colloquium at the Roger Williams University School of Law for helpful comments on an earlier
version of these remarks. I am also grateful to Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, M. Christian Green, and John
Witte, Jr. for their instigation of this Symposium, their invitation to participate, and their insights along the
way. This Essay draws, in part, upon MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT: MULTITIERED MARRIAGE AND THE BOUNDARIES OF CIVIL LAW AND RELIGION (Joel A. Nichols ed., 2012).
1 Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1302 (W.D. Okla. 2010).
2 Okla. House Joint Resolution No. 1056 § 1(C) (2d Sess. 2010).
3 The case is now on appeal before the Tenth Circuit. For a discussion of the amendment from a conflict
of laws perspective, see John T. Parry, Oklahoma’s Save Our State Amendment and the Conflict of Laws
(Lewis & Clark Law Sch., Research Paper No. 2011-21, July 23, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1893707.
4 See, e.g., Symeon Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2010: Twenty-Fourth Annual
Survey, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 303, 320–21 (2011).
5 Family Leader, The Marriage Vow: A Declaration of Dependence upon Marriage and Family,
available at http://www.politico.com/static/PPM187_marriage.html (calling for “[r]ejection of Sharia Islam
and all other anti-woman, anti-human rights forms of totalitarian control”); see also Maggie Haberman, The
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It is unclear what such bans on Sharia law add to the civil law. Could a
court use, rely upon, or enforce Sharia law without such a ban? Would reliance
upon Sharia law ever be permitted or mandated (by a private choice of law
provision by parties, for example)? For that matter, is a clear differentiation
between civil law and Sharia law possible? Further, it is unclear what such a
ban might realistically accomplish. Some committed Muslims who believe
their faith commands application of Sharia law would surely still follow Sharia
principles regardless of the validity of an amendment. They might do so
according to the dictates of their own conscience, but they will surely still
encounter disputes and two religiously observant Muslim parties would almost
certainly seek dispute resolution via Sharia principles. This conceivably could
mean that the parties desire a Muslim judge or arbitrator, or that the parties
desire the decision-maker to apply substantive principles of Sharia to resolve
the dispute, or both. Such dispute resolution would occur outside the civil legal
system and one could presume that a losing party would appeal to the civil
court. Would a civil court adjudicate de novo a claim brought by the losing
party or would civil courts instead give some deference to religious tribunals’
decisions? Does the answer turn on whether it was merely a choice of forum
(with arbitration chosen rather than a civil lawsuit) or a choice of law?
Roughly speaking, Muslims (or any other religious group) might be
interested in deciding three categories of internal disputes according to
religious law.6 First, there are internal disputes about doctrine and leadership.
Such internal decisions are plainly protected by the First Amendment.7 Second,
there are commercial or business disputes. Traditionally, freedom of contract
principles have allowed religious believers to agree to arbitrate such disputes
before a religious arbitrator. The arbitrator’s decision is enforceable in court on
the same basis as any other arbitral decision.8 Third, there are family law

Family Leader Pledge, POLITICO (July 8, 2011), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0711/58591.html
(reporting on U.S. representatives’ endorsement of the pledge).
6 I am grateful to Michael Broyde for this tripartite distinction of disputes, as discussed at a January
2011 presentation at the Association of American Law Schools Section on Jewish Law meeting in San
Francisco, California. This Essay omits discussion of a fourth possible area—decisions made by the criminal
law. One could even posit a fifth area, namely decisions about international law. See RAJ BHALA,
UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC LAW (SHARI’A) 1307–83 (2011) (discussing the international law area). These latter
two categories pertain much more strongly to the state vis-à-vis individuals, or vis-à-vis other states, and thus
this Essay focuses on private dispute resolution rather than public.
7 See JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
EXPERIMENT 241 (3d ed. 2011).
8 See Michael A. Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating Conflicting
Legal Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (discussing cases focusing especially on commercial
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disputes. This is the most contested area because the civil state seeks to
exercise its power over citizens and to enforce norms of equality and
nondiscrimination, especially on behalf of weaker parties, historically women
and children. At the same time, this is the most personal of all spheres. The
family is arguably the foremost arena in which citizens resist the state and are
free to form their own allegiances.9 Further, a person’s identity as a member of
his or her religious community is bound up with that community’s norms
regarding marriage and divorce. Believers will feel a strong pull to follow the
norms of their immediate community rather than overarching state norms if
there is a conflict.
Academic discussions (and often court decisions) in the United States
operate as if there is a one-size-fits-all model of family law and domestic
relations.10 This is coupled with the assumption that the civil state has
exclusive jurisdiction over domestic relations matters.11 Both of these
assumptions are wrong descriptively because the United States is increasingly
multicultural and religiously plural, and its positive laws on marriage and
divorce are already more plural than is often discussed. Moreover, both
assumptions deserve to be challenged normatively because they overstate the
power and reach of the civil law and because they arguably do not match the
goods and goals of liberal democracy, which seeks not only to foster liberty
and equality but also to promote and respect religious liberty and decisions of
conscience and autonomy.
This Essay briefly illustrates the descriptive deficiency in typical
discussions about family law, especially relating to religious citizens, and also
describes new possible pathways and developments. Because this Symposium
is focused on Sharia, Family, and Democracy: Religious Norms and Family
Law in Pluralistic Democratic States,12 this Essay particularly draws on

disputes). There is a burgeoning literature on Islamic banking. See, e.g., MUNAWAR IQBAL & PHILIP
MOLYNEUX, THIRTY YEARS OF ISLAMIC BANKING: HISTORY, PERFORMANCE AND PROSPECTS (2005).
9 See F.C. DeCoste, Caesar’s Faith: Limited Government and Freedom of Religion in Bruker v.
Marcovitz, 32 DALHOUSIE L.J. 153, 175 (2009) (“[O]nly if faith and family are secure from state management
and predation is a state a constitutional state.”).
10 See Barbara Stark, Marriage Proposals, From One-Size Fits-All to Postmodern Marriage Law, 89
CALIF. L. REV. 1479 (2001).
11 See Joel A. Nichols, Multi-Tiered Marriage: Reconsidering the Boundaries of Civil Law and Religion,
in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT, supra note *, at 11; AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES
OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 708(1) (2002); cf. Stark, supra
note 10, at 1482.
12 See John Witte, Jr., Foreword, supra this issue.
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examples from Islam. Part I outlines tensions faced by members of both
minority and majority religious communities, who view their family issues as
controlled by both their religious community and by the demands of the civil
state. Part II explores possible paths ahead for the intersection of religious
beliefs and civil law on marriage and divorce in the United States. The Essay
then offers some concluding reflections.
I. LEGAL PLURALISM,13 MARRIAGE, AND JURISDICTIONAL OVERLAP
For many religious individuals (indeed, even for many nonreligious
individuals), marriage is not merely a private law contract between two
individuals but also an important familial and community event.14 It is not
merely an avenue by which the state confers status benefits on a couple, but
often serves as an entrance marker into various forms of adulthood and
community. It is not merely an act to which compliance with state procedural
forms of adequate notice and consent are sufficient, but often acts as the
marker of union between two families requiring a religious ceremony, a
qualified officiant, and capable and willing parties. Indeed, for many people,
marriage is more important as a religious matter than a civil matter. For them,
a marriage is not valid unless it is between two similarly religious individuals
who have received appropriate solemnization by qualified religious authorities.
Moreover, a marital dissolution is not valid unless granted by competent
religious authorities on adequate grounds via appropriate procedures. A
statement by a civil authority—regarding either marriage or divorce—is simply
not a conclusive statement.
This is partly because, as Ayelet Shachar and others have detailed at length,
individuals exercise complex “citizenships,” whereby they are simultaneously
members of multiple communities.15 Individuals frequently possess strong
citizenship affiliations to a religious group at the same time that they possess a

13 Professor An-Na’im prefers to discuss this in terms of normative pluralism because part of the
description below lumps together positive legal pluralism and social pluralism. Because of space limitations,
this Essay has placed both together here and also has given short shrift to other potentially important
distinctions in the literature on legal pluralism. Cf. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Religious Norms and Family
Law: Is It Legal or Normative Pluralism?, supra this issue.
14 See SEX, MARRIAGE AND FAMILY IN WORLD RELIGIONS (Don S. Browning et al. eds., 2005). See
generally John Witte, Jr. & Joel A. Nichols, More than a Mere Contract: Marriage As Contract and Covenant
in Law and Theology, 5 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 595 (2008).
15 See generally AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND
WOMEN’S RIGHTS (2001).
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citizenship affiliation to the civil state.16 If those two communities lack
alignment on a critical matter, individuals may feel competing normative pulls
and it is not a given that the civil state’s normative stance will control.17
Instead, sometimes the “unofficial law” of the community has a stronger hold
on individuals and communities than the sanctioned, official civil law of the
polity.18 This can and does create dissonance where there is a lack of alignment
between religious precepts and civil law.
This gives rise to two key questions that the United States and other
Western democracies must face about family law. First, how are the norms of
minority religious groups to be accommodated, whether they are those of the
newer, rapidly growing Muslim population or those of more traditional
minorities like Orthodox Jews? Second, how are religious norms of historically
majority groups such as conservative Christians to be accommodated (if at all)
when those norms seem to be out of step with liberal notions of gender
equality or, increasingly, the ability of same sex individuals to marry?
A. Minority Religious Groups: Muslims
Muslims today “represent the second largest religion in Europe and the
third in North America.”19 But Muslims are also on the receiving end of a great
deal of cultural antipathy, allegedly because of their religion; this backlash has
had a substantial uptick after the tragic events of September 11, 2001.20 For
16

See, e.g., id. at 25–28.
In the United States, for example, 70% of Muslims “with a high level of religious commitment . . .
consider themselves to be Muslims first . . . . But among those with a low religious commitment, just 28% see
themselves this way while a 47% plurality identifies first as American and 12% say they consider themselves
equally Muslim and American.” PEW RESEARCH CTR., MUSLIM AMERICANS: MIDDLE CLASS AND MOSTLY
MAINSTREAM 31 (2007), available at http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/muslim-americans.pdf. This is not a
uniquely Islamic notion, as a significant portion of American Christians also identify with their religion first
before identifying with their country. Richard Wike & Greg Smith, Little Support for Terrorism Among
Muslim Americans, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 25, 2011), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1445/little-support-forterrorism-among-muslim-americans.
18 Ann Laquer Estin, Unofficial Family Law, 94 IOWA L. REV. 449, 456 (2009); cf. Sarah Beresford,
Seeking Secularism: Resisting Religiosity in Marriage and Divorce. A Comparative Study of England and
America, 3 WEB JCLI (2011), http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2011/issue3/beresford3.html (advocating for a secular
marriage law and assuming that non-recognition by the state would lead to compliance and adherence to civil
law norms).
19 See KAREN ARMSTRONG, ISLAM: A SHORT HISTORY 141–87 (2000) for an examination of Muslims in
modern society and recent conflict between Muslim and Western culture. See generally JANE I. SMITH, ISLAM
IN AMERICA (1999) for a discussion of the growing Muslim community in the United States.
20 See, e.g., LORI PEEK, BEHIND THE BACKLASH: MUSLIM AMERICANS AFTER 9/11, at 16 (2011) (“In the
aftermath of the terrorist attacks, Muslims experienced a dramatic increase in the frequency and intensity of
these hostile encounters.”).
17
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example, television commentator Bill O’Reilly compared the Quran, Islam’s
holy book, to Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf.21 Talk radio host Michael Savage
told his listeners that lawmakers should institute an “outright ban on Muslim
immigration” in order “to save the United States”; he also recommended
making “the construction of mosques illegal in America.”22 Such verbal
disparagement is not only from talk radio and television hosts, as there was an
enormous public outcry in 2010 against the construction of a mosque near the
site of the World Trade Center attacks in New York.23 Even more recently,
Republican presidential hopeful Herman Cain has insisted that he would not
hire Muslims as part of his administration and has also firmly opposed the
construction of mosques, wrongly justifying this stance on First Amendment
grounds.24 And in March 2011, nearly a decade after 9/11, Representative
Peter King held congressional hearings on terrorism and Islam.25 Indeed, as
Professors Sisk and Heise have said, “We are all living in the shadow of 9/11,
but that shadow appears to be longer and darker for Muslim Americans.”26 To
be sure, there have been calls for accommodation, toleration, and better
incorporation of Muslim beliefs into liberal democracies via respect for
dialogue and respect for multiculturalism. But even these conversations and
actions have, at times, tragically given rise to extreme violence, as recently

21 Deborah Amos, Students Discuss Koran Book After Battle, ABC NEWS (Aug. 25, 2002), http://
abcnews.go.com/Nightline/story?id=128548&page=1.
22 Savage: To “Save the United States,” Lawmakers Should Institute “Outright Ban on Muslim
Immigration” and on “the Construction of Mosques,” MEDIA MATTERS FOR AM. (Nov. 29, 2006, 11:20 AM),
http://mediamatters.org/mmtv/200611290005.
23 E.g., Laurie Goodstein, Around Country, Mosque Projects Meet Opposition, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8,
2010, at A1. For part of the vision of Islamic law from the imam primarily behind the mosque near the site of
the World Trade Center attacks, see Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf, A Cordoba Initiative Project: Justification and
Theory of Sharia Law: How the American Declaration of Independence, Bill of Rights and Constitution are
Consistent with Islamic Law, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 452 (2010).
24 See, e.g., Interview by Neil Cavuto with Herman Cain, CEO, The New Voice, Your World with Neil
Cavuto (Mar. 28, 2011) (Fox News Television broadcast).
25 David A. Fahrenthold & Michelle Boorstein, Hearing Brings Debate on Islam to the Fore, WASH.
POST, Mar. 9, 2011, at A1 (contending that the hearings implicitly asked the “most important question: How
should America talk about Muslim Americans?”); see also PEEK, supra note 20, at 17–35 (including examples
of controversial Quran burning by a Florida pastor, violent physical acts against Muslims, harassment, etc.).
26 Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Muslims and Religious Liberty in the Era of 9-11: Empirical
Evidence from the Federal Courts 59 (Univ. of St. Thomas Legal Studies Research Paper No. 11-23, 2011),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1917057. The paper shows that Muslims face a “distinct and substantial
disadvantage” when asserting U.S. constitutional free exercise or religious accommodation claims, in addition
to the cultural challenges mentioned above. Id.
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witnessed in Norway when Anders Breivik slaughtered dozens of people,
ostensibly because they supported the Muslim population in Norway.27
To date, most political controversies in the United States have not extended
directly to family law matters. They focus instead on the building of mosques
or on generic charges of the imposition of Sharia law in general.28 In Canada
and the United Kingdom, however, Islamic family law has been a flashpoint.
In both places, the focus has been whether to permit Muslims to adjudicate
family law disputes according to religious principles through religious
arbitration. In both places, opposition has centered, in part, on political
opposition to the principles of Sharia law and the fear of its possible
“imposition” upon citizens of those countries.29 And in both places, Islamic
religious arbitration of family law disputes has continued, despite opposition.
1. Canada
In Ontario, Canada, legislators passed the Arbitration Act of 1991 to
provide an alternative to settling disputes within the court system.30 The act
allowed parties to choose the law under which the arbitration would be
conducted. The plain language of the statute seemed to indicate that any law,
not just various provincial laws, would be permitted.31 This meant that, in
practice, Christians, Jews, Muslims, and people of other faiths could arbitrate
their disputes, including family law disputes, according to the principles of
their faith. In fact, this statute simply formalized what was already a settled
practice, in which “family matters [had been] arbitrated based on religious
teachings for many years in Jewish, Muslim, and Christian settings.”32 In
addition, the act required Ontario courts to “uphold arbitrators’ decisions if
both sides enter the process voluntarily and if results are fair, equitable, and do
not violate Canadian law.”33

27 Miguel Marquez & Lee Ferran, Norway Shooting Suspect Anders Breivik: Attacks Were ‘Price of
Their Treason,’ ABC NEWS (July 25, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/anders-breivik-hearing-closedpulpit-alleged-shooter/story?id=14152129.
28 See supra text accompanying notes 20–26.
29 See Arsani William, An Unjust Doctrine of Civil Arbitration: Sharia Courts in Canada and England,
11 STAN. J. INT’L REL. 40, 42–43 (2010).
30 Arbitration Act, S.O. 1991, c. 17.
31 Id. art. 32(1) (“In deciding a dispute, an arbitral tribunal shall apply the rules of law designated by the
parties.”).
32 MARION BOYD, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW: PROTECTING CHOICE, PROMOTING INCLUSION
4 (2004), available at http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/boyd/fullreport.pdf.
33 Arbitration Act, arts. 34, 46.
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This system functioned without fanfare until fall 2003, when Syed Mumtaz
Ali announced that the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice (“IICJ”) had been
established “to ensure that Islamic principles of family and inheritance law
could be used to resolve disputes within the Muslim community in Canada.”34
Mumtaz Ali’s statements to the media about the IICJ created public concern
that Ontario had granted special rights to Sharia courts to settle disputes
between Muslims.35 Citizens and citizens’ groups brought their concerns to the
Ontarian government, which authorized former Attorney General Marion Boyd
to investigate the current system of arbitration.36 Thorough investigation led to
a 2004 report endorsing the continued use of arbitration as an alternative
dispute resolution mechanism in family law, albeit with certain
recommendations for improvement to ensure consent and promote equality.37
The public did not favorably receive the report.38 The province adopted
many of the Boyd Report’s procedural recommendations,39 but it firmly
rejected the notion that a choice of law clause selecting religious law for the
family law arbitration could be valid.40 Instead, all family law arbitration in the
province must be conducted exclusively under Ontarian and Canadian law.41
This decision was proclaimed on the inauspicious date of September 11, 2005,
when Premier Dalton McGuinty announced: “There will be no Sharia law in
Ontario. There will be no religious arbitration in Ontario. There will be one
law for all Ontarians.”42 Ontarian law now states that “[i]n a family arbitration,
the arbitral tribunal shall apply the substantive law of Ontario, unless the
parties expressly designate the substantive law of another Canadian

34

See BOYD, supra note 32, at 3.
For further discussion of the controversy, and especially about Syed Mumtaz Ali, see Daniel Cere,
Canadian Conjugal Mosaic: From Multiculturalism to Multi-Conjugalism?, in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A
MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT, supra note *, at 284, 297–300); see also Faisal Kutty, The Myth and Reality of
“Sharia Courts” in Canada: A Delayed Opportunity for the Indigenization of Islamic Legal Rulings, 7 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 559 (2010).
36 See BOYD, supra note 32, at 3–6.
37 Id. Boyd’s recommendations call for more government involvement to oversee and evaluate
arbitration, education, and training for arbitrators, education for the public about the arbitration process, and a
requirement that parties to arbitrations obtain independent legal advice.
38 See Estin, supra note 18, at 468.
39 Id. at 469.
40 See id.
41 Id.
42 Prithi Yelaja & Robert Benzie, McGuinty: No Sharia Law, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 12, 2005, at A1; see
also Les Perreaux, Quebec Rejects Islamic Law, TORONTO STAR, May 27, 2005, at A8. Quebec has taken the
same position. While Ontario was still debating its use, lawmakers in Quebec “unanimously rejected use of
Islamic tribunals in its legal system.” Id.
35
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jurisdiction, in which case that substantive law shall be applied.”43 Although
formal Ontarian law is once again uniform and civil courts will not enforce
family arbitrations that purport to apply religious law, this does not mean that
religious arbitrations have ceased. Rather, Muslim arbitrations have “merely
becom[e] invisible to official law without ceasing operations.”44
2. United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, family law disputes are resolved, at times, by
religious arbitration. At present, religious arbitration tribunals “do not have
binding legal authority,” but courts “already do take notice of th[eir]
proceedings occasionally.”45 Islamic arbitration tribunals in the United
Kingdom are particularly strong in the London and Birmingham areas.46
“These councils generally acknowledge the legitimacy of each others’
judgments,” and they offer regularized procedures and provide advice and
decision-making for applicants.47 Generally, civil courts in the United
Kingdom claim exclusive jurisdiction over divorce.48 Marriage is generally
thought to be a civil matter and thus the state arrogates to itself the entirety of
43 Family Statute Law Amendment Act, S.O. 2006, c. 1, art. 32, available at http://www.ontla.on.ca/bills/
bills-files/38_Parliament/Session2/b027ra.pdf. In addition, the explanatory note to the amendment states that
“[t]he term ‘family arbitration’ is applied only to processes conducted exclusively in accordance with the law
of Ontario or of another Canadian jurisdiction. Other third-party decision-making processes in family matters
are not family arbitrations and have no legal effect.” Id. This not only effectively cut off the rights of Muslims
to settle disputes in family matters under Islamic law, but also eliminated the rights of other religious traditions
as well, including the rabbinic courts that had been present and practicing in Ontario since 1889. See, e.g., Ron
Csillag, Jewish Groups Say New Bill Targets Beit Dins, CANADIAN JEWISH NEWS (Toronto), Jan. 26, 2006,
http://www.cjc.ca/2006/01/25/jewish-groups-say-new-bill-targets-beit-dins.
44 Prakash Shah, A Reflection on the Shari’a Debate in Britain, in 13 STUDIA Z PRAWA WYZNANIOWEGO
[STUD. ECCLESIASTICAL L.] 71, 82 (2010) (citing Marion Boyd, The Past, Present and Future of Arbitration in
Religious Contexts: Reflections on Ontario Law in a Comparative Context, Lecture at the Institute of
Advanced Studies, London (July 10, 2009)).
45 John R. Bowen, How Could English Courts Recognize Shariah?, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 411, 412–13
(2010); see also GILLIAN DOUGLAS ET AL., SOCIAL COHESION AND CIVIL LAW: MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND
RELIGIOUS COURTS (2011), available at http://www.law.cf.ac.uk/clr/Social%20Cohesion%20and%20Civil%
20Law%20Full%20Report.pdf.
46 See Bowen, supra note 45, at 418.
47 Id. at 418–19. If a couple is only religiously married, only an Islamic divorce is needed. If a couple has
registered their marriage or used their marriage as part of their immigration status, then they usually also
pursue a civil divorce. Id. at 419. Sometimes these councils provide full adjudication of the parties’ divorce
issues, for many Islamic couples that come to them have not married civilly, but only religiously. For example,
one study indicated that twenty-seven percent of all Muslim marriages in the United Kingdom were not
officially married under English law. Werner Menski, Law, Religion and Culture in Multicultural Britain, in
LAW AND RELIGION IN MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES 43, 46 (Rubya Mehdi et al. eds., 2008) (citing S.N. SHAHKAZEMI, UNTYING THE KNOT: MUSLIM WOMEN, DIVORCE AND THE SHARIAH (2001)).
48 See Divorce (Religious Marriages) Act, 2002, c. 27.

NICHOLS GALLEYSFINAL2

976

11/18/2011 9:35 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

power to dissolve a marriage.49 But this is not entirely effective, leading at
times to “‘limping divorces’ whereby a union may be regarded as dissolved (or
not) in religious law but not in civil law, and vice versa.”50 This kind of
disconnect between religious law and civil law, when combined with premises
of multiculturalism and the deep commitments of religious believers, has led to
calls for greater legal recognition of the decisions of religious tribunals.
The most significant call for such “recognition” came in February 2008 by
Anglican Archbishop Rowan Williams. In a lecture at the Royal Courts of
Justice, the Archbishop suggested that some “accommodation” of Muslim
family law was “unavoidable” in England.51 He carefully explored the
“growing challenge” of “the presence of communities which, while no less
‘law-abiding’ than the rest of the population, relate to something other than the
British legal system alone.”52 He considered “what degree of accommodation
the law of the land can and should give to minority communities with their
own strongly entrenched legal and moral codes” and explored avenues of
potential “plural jurisdiction” that might lead the civil legal system to
“recognize sharia.”53 Although these remarks gave rise to a firestorm of
criticism in the press (with some alleging that England would be
countenancing “licensed polygamy” if it adhered to the remarks),54 Britain’s
highest Justice, Lord Phillips, joined the Archbishop four months later in
public remarks.55 He stated that certain elements of Sharia law, including
family law, needed to be embraced—in part because this could be done
contractually and on an equal basis with other choice of law matters. Such a
suggestion was “not very radical,” he said, “and our system already goes a long
way towards accommodating the Archbishop’s suggestion.”56

49

See id., as now contained in Section 10A of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, which provides that a
court may delay issuing a civil divorce decree if the parties fail to certify that a Jewish religious divorce has
been granted by an appropriate authority. See also Menski, supra note 47, at 58–59 (discussing history of the
law and its possible application to Muslim marriages as well as Jewish marriages).
50 See DOUGLAS, supra note 45, at 14–15.
51 See Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury, Civil and Religious Law in England: A Religious
Perspective (Feb. 7, 2008), reprinted in SHARI’A IN THE WEST 293 (Rex Ahdar & Nicholas Aroney eds., 2010).
52 Id.
53 Id. at 294, 298.
54 See, e.g., Catherine Bennett, It’s One Sharia Law for Men and Quite Another for Women, GUARDIAN,
Feb. 9, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/feb/10/religion.law.
55 Lord Phillips, Lord Chief Just. England & Wales, Equality Before the Law (July 3, 2008), reprinted in
SHARI’A IN THE WEST, supra note 51, at 309–18.
56 Id. at 317.
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The Archbishop was not calling for the establishment of a parallel system
of independent Muslim courts in England, and he certainly was not calling for
the direct enforcement of Sharia law by English civil courts.57 He was, instead,
raising a whole series of hard but “unavoidable” questions about marital,
cultural, and religious identity and practice in Western democratic societies
committed to human rights for all,58 and about the boundaries of
multiculturalism and identity in a liberal society.59 What forms of marriage
should citizens be able to choose and what forums of religious marriage law
should state governments be required to respect? How should Muslims and
other religious groups with distinctive family norms and cultural practices that
vary from those espoused by the liberal state be accommodated in a society
dedicated to religious liberty, equality, self-determination, and
nondiscrimination? Is legal pluralism, or even “personal federalism,” necessary
to protect Muslims and other religious believers who are conscientiously
opposed to the liberal values that inform modern state laws on sex, marriage,
and family? Must there instead be “legal universalism” with its attendant
“exclusionary consequences”?60 Are these really the only options or instead is
a “dance” between religious and civil law, with a series of “regulated
interactions” that inform each sphere, more appropriate and necessary?61
3. United States
In the United States, there is less experience with the application of Sharia
family law and there are fewer reported conflicts between civil courts and
Islamic religious tribunals. When civil courts run into matters of Islamic law,
such as application of the Mahr (the gift of a bridegroom to his bride at the
beginning of marriage) and its division at divorce, they have attempted to treat

57

“[The Archbishop] was not arguing in favour of a full-fledged application of the Sharia in the United
Kingdom, but he was rather pleading in favour of a better inclusion of religious sensitivities into the British
legal process.” Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens, Religious Courts’ Recognition Claims: Two Qualitatively
Distinct Narratives, in SHARI’A IN THE WEST, supra note 51, at 59, 59.
58 See Williams, supra note 51, at 302.
59 Cf. Michael Boulette, An Apology for the Archbishop: Shari’ah Law and the Jurisprudence of
Multiculturalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRIT. RACE PERSP. 1 (2010).
60 See Gaudreault-DesBiens, supra note 57, at 59; cf. Mohammad H. Fadel, Political Liberalism, Islamic
Family Law and Family Law Pluralism: Lessons from New York on Family Law Arbitration, in MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE IN A MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT, supra note *, at 164.
61 See Michael J. Broyde, New York’s Regulation of Jewish Marriage: Covenant, Contract, or Statute?,
in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT, supra note *, at 138, 163 (“dance”); Ayelet
Shachar, State, Religion, and the Family: The New Dilemmas of Multicultural Accommodation, in SHARI’A IN
THE WEST, supra note 51, at 115, 127 (“regulated interaction”).
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the Islamic law contract like any other premarital contract.62 Islam has largely
cooperated with this, for it treats marriage primarily like a contract. Drawing
upon this notion of autonomy and freedom of contract, Professor Mohammad
Fadel has argued that a “liberal family law” in the United States and Canada is
ideal and that a proper understanding of a liberal family law would allow for
“arbitration of family law disputes.”63 Under his vision, this would allow for
enforcement of arbitral awards by civil courts. Those courts would not have to
delve into any issues of religious interpretation, such as varying interpretations
of the Mahr, because such matters would have been decided by freely chosen
arbitration.64 Whether such a vision is, or would be, acceptable in the U.S.
political climate seems unlikely given the other cultural backlash against
Muslims.65
B. Historically Majority Religion: Christianity
The common law in the United States has, for years, been predicated on
notions of Christian marriage and divorce.66 The norms of liberal society,
however, have recently seemed to move increasingly out of alignment with
traditional norms, especially for conservative Christians and other cultural
conservatives. These battles are not just about same-sex marriage but, more
broadly, about the American family.67 A host of family issues, including
contraception, abortion, and privacy rights in general, has contributed to the
perception of competing norms in society for many years.68 The onset of nofault divorce (and the lack of any “grandfathering” provisions for those
62 See, e.g., Chaudry v. Chaudry, 388 A.2d 1000, 1003 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978); see also
PASCALE FOURNIER, MUSLIM MARRIAGE IN WESTERN COURTS: LOST IN TRANSPLANTATION 42–50 (2010)
(discussing marriage laws in the United States in reference to the Mahr); cf. Nathan Oman, Bargaining in the
Shadow of God’s Law: Islamic Mahr Contracts and the Perils of Legal Specialization, 45 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 579, 580 (2010) (criticizing the Chaudry court for failing to understand the actual intentions of the
parties).
63 See generally Fadel, supra note 60.
64 Id. (“The space liberalism creates for private ordering within the family is sufficient for robust
manifestations of Islamic family life that are also consistent with the minimum requirements of liberalism.”).
Other writers are quite concerned that any sort of delegation or decentralization of this nature will lead to
adverse effects for women and children. See, e.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Perils of Privatized Marriage,
in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT, supra note *, at 253.
65 The Jewish minority community in the United States has long faced issues at the intersection of civil
and religious law of marriage and divorce. See Broyde, supra note 61.
66 See, e.g., JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION, AND LAW IN THE
WESTERN TRADITION 194 (1997).
67 Cf. June Carbone, Marriage As a State of Mind: Federalism, Contract, and the Expressive Interest in
Family Law, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 49.
68 See, e.g., Commentary, Conservatism, Privacy, and Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1981, at A22.
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married under other regimes), the adverse effects of divorce on weaker parties
(especially women and children), the sheer number of divorced individuals, the
increased judicial solicitude toward cohabitation, and the attendant creation of
alternative legal norms for the same all contribute to a perceived conflict for
conservative Christians, who are increasingly not the majority political
group.69
Two situations from the past fifteen years exemplify the conservative
Christian response to cultural dissonance about marriage. The first, and more
recent, response involves ballot initiatives against same-sex marriage. For
many conservative Christians, marriage is solely between a man and a
woman.70 This has led to efforts to reify that view of marriage and divorce in
the law through seeking to enact statutes at both the federal and state levels
(Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) and mini-DOMAs), opposing judicial
decisions that are favorable to same-sex marriage, and various other political
campaigns.71
A second, slightly older response is the legislative enactment of an alternate
structure of marriage within the civil law. These alternate structures are called
“covenant marriage statutes” and they are currently in place in Louisiana,
Arkansas, and Arizona.72 Beginning in the late 1990s, these covenant marriage
statutes were enacted to encourage long-term marriage by offering a voluntary
alternative to the legal standard of no-fault divorce.73 Covenant marriage
statutes enact two versions of marriage in the law of any given state: regular,
easy-in and easy-out marriage, and a covenant marriage.74 Couples desiring to
enter covenant marriages must undergo additional premarital counseling or
waiting periods and attest that they understand that marriage is a lifelong
commitment. If covenant couples desire to divorce, they face longer waiting

69

See, e.g., NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL POLARIZATION

AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE 67–73 (2009).
70 See PEW RESEARCH CTR., SUPPORT FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE EDGES UPWARD: MAJORITY CONTINUES

FAVOR
GAYS
SERVING
OPENLY
IN
MILITARY
6
(2010),
available
at
TO
http://pewforum.org/uploadedFiles/Topics/Issues/Gay_Marriage_and_Homosexuality/same-sex-marriage-10full-report.pdf (describing substantial resistance to same-sex marriage among a number of religious groups,
especially among those considered to be more conservative).
71 See, e.g., Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 3111-1-1 (2011); Smelt v. Cnty. of Orange, 447 F.3d 673, 676 (9th Cir. 2006).
72 See John Witte, Jr. & Joel A. Nichols, Introduction, in COVENANT MARRIAGE IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 1, 1–25 (John Witte, Jr. & Eliza Ellison eds., 2005).
73 Id. at 1–2.
74 Id.
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periods or a requirement of fault, and they have an obligation to seek
counseling to encourage reconciliation.75
These are two opposite moves by Christian groups, but both seek to regain
or recapture a Christian understanding of marriage in the civil law. The first
seeks an exclusive, exclusionary definition of marriage. The second seeks a
state-sanctioned, alternative definition. There is also a third option, which has
yet to gain as much traction. A few conservative commentators have begun to
seek to unwind the traditional Protestant reliance on the civil law. They have
begun to talk about separating civil marriage and religious marriage, with the
former belonging to the province of the state and the latter to the province of
the church.76 There is virtually no political appetite for this at the moment, and
it remains to be seen whether one will develop. Christians have also not much
availed themselves of religious arbitration for family law matters (at least not
in the way that Muslims and Jews have),77 and have certainly not often sought
civil court enforcement of their own religious arbitration of family law.
Taken together, the responses of both the minority Islamic communities
and the majority Christian communities underscore the centrality of religion to
marriage. Whether members of a majority religious group, currently
Christians, or a minority group, like Muslims or others, believers live with
claims made upon them both as citizens of the civil state and as citizens of
their religious belief systems. As they seek to live out their faith, they may, at
times, be forced to choose between competing normative orders.
II. POSSIBLE PATHS AHEAD
As Professor Brian Tamanaha recently wrote, “The longstanding image of
a uniform and monopolistic law that governs a society is plainly obsolete.”78 If
this is true as a descriptive matter, what does it mean for family law in the

75

Id. at 1–2, 23–24.
Cf. Kmiec Proposes End of Legally Recognized Marriage, CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY (May 28, 2009,
4:41 AM), http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/kmiec_proposes_end_of_legally_recognized_marriage
(reporting the views of Douglas Kmiec, who argues that we should turn over the concept of marriages to
churches and allow any couple to get a “civil license”).
77 See Azizah Y. Al-Hibri, The Nature of Islamic Marriage, in COVENANT MARRIAGE IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 72, at 182, 215; Michael J. Broyde, The Covenant-Contract Dialectic in Jewish
Marriage and Divorce Law, in COVENANT MARRIAGE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 72, at 53,
63–64.
78 Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Framework for Pluralistic Socio-Legal Arenas, in CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND
THE LAW: STATE RESPONSES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 381, 400 (Marie-Claire Foblets et al. eds., 2010).
76
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United States? Will we as a society find ways to recognize and accommodate
believers with differing understandings of marriage and divorce? Given the
dissonance internal to family law for many religious believers, such as
Muslims in the United States, what are the possible avenues for interaction
between civil law and religion in the United States?79 Four possibilities
immediately suggest themselves.80
First, and in some ways the most extreme, is that one could “take the state
out of the business of deciding what is a marriage and leave that question to the
churches” and other religious groups.81 This approach would attempt to divide
conclusively the notions of “civil marriage” and “religious marriage,” which
lie at the heart of many of the debates about marriage. It would disentangle the
state and, by enacting civil unions, the state would presumably prioritize the
value of equality. Proposals of this nature have been floated by those on both
the left and right of the political spectrum.82 This seems an unlikely political
result, though, in part because a somewhat similar concept was bandied about
in Canada (which is often more liberal on family law matters than most U.S.
states) in recent years and gained very little political traction even there.83
Second, a quite different approach might be that the state should remain
involved in regulating marriage and that it should do so according to one’s
particular religious, moral, or political views. This used to be the avenue of
choice for Christians, but it has increasingly led to conflict as society has
become more liberal on both entrance to and exit from marriage and
conservative Christian groups have felt alienated. This conflict has been
79 Critics might broadly contend that the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution completely prohibits
direct involvement of religion in matters of family law. Such an assertion is both an overreading of Supreme
Court precedent and a misunderstanding of the principle of separation of church and state in the United States.
For further discussion, see John Witte Jr. & Joel A. Nichols, The Frontiers of Marital Pluralism: An
Afterword, in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT, supra note *, at 357.
80 Of course, there may be more than four, or a different grouping of possibilities. See, e.g., Brian H. Bix,
Pluralism and Decentralization in Marriage Regulation, in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A MULTICULTURAL
CONTEXT, supra note *, at 60, 64 (listing alternative ways the regulation of marriage could become more
decentralized); see also Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital
Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 173–200 (1998).
81 Stephen B. Presser, Marriage and the Law: Time for a Divorce?, in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A
MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT, supra note *, at 78, 81.
82 See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, The Meaning of Marriage, in MARRIAGE PROPOSALS:
QUESTIONING A LEGAL STATUS 29–69 (Anita Bernstein ed., 2006); Martha C. Nussbaum, A Right to Marry?
98 CALIF. L. REV. 667, 671–72 (2010); Edward A. Zelinsky, Deregulating Marriage: The Pro-Marriage Case
for Abolishing Civil Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1161, 1163 (2006).
83 LAW COMM’N OF CAN., BEYOND CONJUGALITY: RECOGNIZING AND SUPPORTING CLOSE PERSONAL
ADULT RELATIONSHIPS (2001), available at http://www.samesexmarriage.ca/docs/beyond_conjugalty.pdf.
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substantially exacerbated by the same-sex marriage debates over the past
decade and it has resulted in reignited culture wars. There have been DOMAs,
state level mini-DOMAs, state court decisions in favor of same-sex marriage,
sometimes (in California, for example) democratic reversal of such decisions,
and, occasionally (in New York, for example) democratic instatement of the
possibility of same-sex marriage.84 Perhaps these winner-take-all political
battles will continue to be the norm, but at present they show little promise of
settling in one position. Religious conservatives seem to be on the “losing”
side of public opinion about same-sex marriage and may feel more isolated as
they lose political clout on these matters.85
Third, a variation on the instantiation of one’s religious values into civil
law as the exclusive governing law for marriage and divorce would be to have
some state law conform to one’s desires. One possibility is that civil marriage
and divorce law could be a political compromise on its internal points, even at
the risk of internal incoherence. A much stronger possibility would be an
explicit recognition that religious groups may want or need a closer
relationship with the civil law. Thus, a state might enact more than one
comprehensive scheme of marriage and divorce law. Louisiana’s “covenant
marriage law” is an example through which couples choose whether to enter
into a regular marriage with easy entrance and no-fault divorce, or enter into a
covenant marriage, which requires, inter alia, premarital counseling and has
correspondingly higher exit requirements.86 A state might enact parts of civil
legal schemes necessary to assist or bridge the space between civil and
religious marriage and divorce for its citizens. New York’s “get” statutes are
an example of this model.87 By enacting those statutes, New York’s legislature
sought to prevent a situation whereby a Jewish woman was civilly divorced but
not religiously divorced; it did so by fostering greater cooperation between
civil and religious authorities in an “invisible dance,” as Professor Michael
Broyde has described it.88 But neither covenant marriage statutes nor
84 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5, invalidated by Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d. 921 (N.D. Cal.
2010)); Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7, 18 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384
(Cal. 2008); e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2 (2009); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 10-a, 10-b, 11, 13 (McKinney,
2010), amended by Marriage Equality Act (June 24, 2011).
85 As another proposed advancement for same-sex marriage, some have suggested choice of law
proposals across state lines whereby couples in one state could “choose” the marriage law of another state to
govern them. See, e.g., Adam Candeub & Mae Kuykendall, Modernizing Marriage, 44 MICH. J. L. REFORM
735 (2011).
86 Witte & Nichols, supra note 72, at 1–2.
87 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253.
88 See Broyde, supra note 61, at 159.
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legislatively enacted “get” statutes seem promising as practical solutions. Only
three states have enacted covenant marriage statutes (and none since 2001) and
few couples in those states have availed themselves of the covenant marriage
option; only New York has passed a “get” statute despite other states’ attempts
in the past twenty years.89
Fourth, one could draw upon the increased solicitude in the law for the
parties to insert their own values into the law through pre- and post-marital
agreements. Couples might do so directly—by placing restrictions on when
they could divorce, for example, directly into the premarital contract, but a
state would typically still find such restrictions against public policy.90 Or a
couple could use such contractual methods to designate an arbitration forum to
resolve their disputes. Such a choice of forum is typically enforceable, but—as
seen above with the Ontario and United Kingdom examples—is more
controversial when a religious forum is designated in family law matters. Even
more controversial could be the parties’ designation of a choice of law within
that choice of forum. It is this latter item, the choice of law, that would matter
greatly to religious individuals, for then they would be able better to align their
commitments as both religious and political citizens. But such religious
arbitration, especially on choice of law matters, would itself likely be contested
by the state—because conservative religious principles may be out of
alignment with the political state’s norms and aspirations, especially regarding
gender equality matters.91 Such religious arbitration has recently started to
receive increased scholarly attention92 and seems poised to give rise to
89 See STEVEN L. NOCK, LAURA A. SANCHEZ & JAMES D. WRIGHT, COVENANT MARRIAGE: THE
MOVEMENT TO RECLAIM TRADITION IN AMERICA 3 (2008) (describing how only two percent of couples
entered covenant marriages during the first five years of the law’s enactment (1998–2001)). This has been
attributed to a lack of interest by couples, a lack of knowledge of the law (partly due to the failure of clerks to
inform engaged couples), and the failure of institutionalized religion to encourage or mandate covenant
marriages. There is also a “get” statute in the United Kingdom. Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, 1973, c. 18,
§ 10A (inserted by Divorce (Religious Marriages Act), 2002, c. 27).
90 See Brian H. Bix, The ALI Principles and Agreements: Seeking a Balance Between Status and
Contract, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE’S PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 372, 372 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006).
91 See, e.g., Aleem v. Aleem, 947 A.2d 489, 500–502 (Md. Ct. App. 2008) (disapproving of Islamic
religious marital dissolution because it gave right to divorce only to the husband; the civil court revisited issues
and decided marital property matters anew); see also Rajni K. Sekhri, Aleem v. Aleem: A Divorce from the
Proper Comity Standard—Lowering the Bar that Courts Must Reach to Deny Recognizing Foreign Judgments,
68 MD. L. REV. 662, 677–690 (2009) (criticizing decision for denying comity to Pakistani divorce and
suggesting the same result could have been reached by relying on the state’s interest in equitable division of
property).
92 See, e.g., Helfand, supra note 8; Nicholas Walter, The Status of Religious Arbitration in the United
States and Canada, SANTA CLARA L. REV. (forthcoming 2011).
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additional articles and court opinions as U.S. society becomes more mobile and
multicultural, even as it seeks to balance the role of the civil state with
individuals’ adherence to their own religious norms. Whether U.S. courts will
treat religious arbitrations of family law matters the same as arbitrations of
other matters is still an open question.93
One avenue that is not viable, however, is to presume that Professor
Brian Tamanaha is incorrect and that, in family law matters, there can be one
“uniform and monopolistic law”94 that has robust effect and implementation.
We would be better served to recognize, as Professor Werner Menski has said,
that “we must all be conscious pluralists, whether we like it or not.”95 This
means that “unofficial law” will operate regardless of what the civil law says.
That is, some individuals are going to feel bound by their communal (religious)
norms, regardless of what the civil law says. And some individuals are going to
seek religious adjudication of their disputes (as Muslims in Ontario and the
United Kingdom do), even if the civil law refuses to enforce those arbitral
judgments. Failing to understand these matters means that a liberal state may
protect vulnerable parties the least when the state claims and seeks to exercise
hegemonic control over marriage and divorce. Instead, it may be that only
through recognizing and respecting alternate norm systems may the state have
more of an avenue to affect change and protect vulnerable parties.96

93 Compare John Witte, Jr. & Joel A. Nichols, Faith-Based Family Laws in Western Democracies?, 2010
FIDES ET LIBERTAS 122, 123 (2010) (“The United States . . . has become the least accommodating of its
Muslim citizens [compared to some other nations, and has not] readily accommodated Muslim family law.”),
with Luke W. Goodrich, Sharia Across the Pond, GUARDIAN WKLY, July 6, 2009, available at http://www.
guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2009/jul/06/sharia-courts-us-islam (claiming that U.S. law has “long
recognised Sharia tribunals”).
94 Tamanaha, supra note 78, at 400.
95 Werner Menski, Ancient and Modern Boundary Crossings Between Personal Laws and Civil Law in
Composite India, in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT, supra note *, at 219, 222.
96 This raises two other significant issues, which are unhappily relegated to a footnote because of space.
First, there are (or should be) very serious concerns from a religious perspective of any conversation about
joint governance (to use Ayelet Shachar’s term) with the state because this suggests less than full respect for
religious liberty and separation of church and state; it runs a very serious risk of the state co-opting religion
and shaping that religion. Indeed, that would be one aim of the state, presumably—and would be exactly the
kind of thing a religious person would want to avoid. See, e.g., DeCoste, supra note 9, at 165. Second, there is
an issue about whether religious liberty is a natural right or whether it instead is derivative of the state. See,
e.g., id. at 167.
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CONCLUSION
Oklahoma’s Save Our State Amendment purports to disallow Sharia law
entirely, but even if that amendment is held to be constitutional, it will not
eliminate adherence to Sharia law among faithful Muslims. Merely
proclaiming that Sharia law will be disallowed does not mean that it will not be
followed; it would mean, at most, that it would not be enforced by civil courts.
At least for some observant Muslims, the effect will be the same as in the
United Kingdom or Ontario: Islamic religious arbitrations will continue to
exist, but outside the protection of the law. There are hard and yet unresolved
questions about how a liberal democracy like the United States is going to
incorporate all its citizens into the polity and promote values of liberty,
equality, and nondiscrimination while also respecting and promoting religious
liberty and personal autonomy. These questions pertain not only to the growing
Muslim population in the United States, but equally to the majority Christian
population.
In short, we must face the question whether it is possible for our law to
recognize the dual nature of marriage for many citizens in society, whereby
they are bound not only to civil norms regarding marriage and divorce but also
to religious norms. Can we take seriously those dual allegiances while also
hewing to the overarching norms of equality and protection for vulnerable
parties that are part of the fabric of the larger civil society itself? These dual
allegiances will exist, even if we are reluctant to talk about them. Whether and
how we choose to acknowledge those allegiances and deal with the tensions
remains to be seen.

